Istanbul – Hürriyet Daily News
What happened to Armenians in Anatolia in 1915 is no
longer a taboo in Turkey and there is open discussion about it, says expert
Aybars Görgülü. The Armenian diaspora needs to realize this change, and Turkey
should establish dialogue mechanisms with all segments of the diaspora, he adds
Any government in Turkey that opens borders with Armenia
without first convincing Azerbaijan will be committing political suicide, says
Aybars Görgülü, adding that Baku has more leverage on Ankara than vice versa.
DAILY NEWS photos, Emrah GÜREL
Barçın Yinanç barcin.yinanc@hurriyet.com.tr
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s recent visit to
Yerevan has revived hopes for the normalization of ties between Turkey and
Armenia, which currently have no diplomatic relations. However, frustrated by
the failure of the 2009 reconciliation process, Armenians will approach any new
initiative more cautiously, according to Aybars Görgülü, program officer at the
Foreign Policy Program of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
(TESEV).
The role of the Armenian diaspora is particularly
important and Ankara should establish dialogue with all segments of it, Görgülü
said, adding that the diaspora also needed to realize the change in the Turks’
approach to what happened in 1915.
What was the picture on Turkish–Armenian relations prior
to Davutoğlu’s trip?
Relations have been deadlocked since 2009, as the
protocols [to normalize relations] that were signed were not later approved.
Azerbaijan was a crucial blocker. The borders between Armenia and Turkey remain
closed. Davutoğlu saw an opportunity to make a goodwill gesture, but no big
expectations should be anticipated from this visit.
You are convinced that the process was blocked by Baku?
This is one of the primary reasons. When both sides
negotiated the texts of the protocols, Nagorno Karabakh was not on the paper.
Although I’m sure the diplomats discussed the issue, it was not presented as a
precondition. But after the signing, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said
the two issues were linked, and Nagorno Karabakh is now a strong pre-condition.
Apparently the failure of the process has created a loss
of confidence in Armenia.
Definitely. The signing of the protocols created a good
atmosphere, but the failure of the process has created huge disappointment.
When we talk to our counterparts in Armenian civil society they blame Turkey. I
think both sides have made mistakes, but I think Turkey has a bigger role.
What made Davutoğlu go to Yerevan?
There are a couple of reasons. 2015 is approaching. In
the past two years there has been almost no official contact, and not going
there would also have been problematic. Turkey wants to open a new channel of
dialogue with Armenia before 2015, to give the international community the
message that Turkey is not isolating Armenia and that the two are on speaking
terms. For example, Davutoğlu said the deportation [the decision that led to
the death of Armenians] was “inhumane.” The message he gave was for 2015. He
underlined the humanitarian dimension.
The fact that Turkey’s initiatives were triggered by the
approach of 2015 probably makes Armenians more intransigent, doesn’t it?
Armenians don’t trust Turkey’s motives. They approach it
with suspicion because they believe that Turkey wants to launch an initiative
with 2015 in mind. So they will approach another round of initiatives coming
from Turkey with caution. They don’t want to be involved in a reconciliation
process that will bear no results in the end. But the important thing about
2015, apart from the diplomatic initiative, is what Turkey will actually do
about 1915.
Will Turkey apologize? Will a government official make a
statement creating empathy for the tragedy? Or build a statue? I think all the
options are being evaluated in Ankara. Everyone is expected Turkey to do
something. From the signals we receive, Turkey is doing something defensive to
answer allegations, but it is also getting prepared for other types of
activities. An apology is difficult, but it may be something to create empathy,
which is key to reconciliation with Armenia. There needs to be a remedy,
otherwise something will be missing.
What came of Davutoğlu’s visit?
Davutoğlu made an important declaration, saying the
deportation was “inhumane.” Turkey should continue diplomacy with Azerbaijan to
find common ground, as Davutoğlu also said there were three actors in this
game. Although I don’t know exactly how much leverage Turkey has on Azerbaijan,
Baku has more leverage on Ankara than vice versa.
What makes you say that?
There is increasing interdependency between the two,
particularly with the Trans-Anatolian pipeline project [which will carry Azeri
oil to Europe via Turkey], and a new gas deal. There is increasing foreign
direct investment from Azerbaijan. In 2008 there was a problematic period; the
gas deal was over and both sides started harsh negotiations on the pricing of
gas and the transit fee. All the brotherhood and fraternity rhetoric was put
aside and both sides prioritized national interests. At this stage, the
[Armenian] protocol process came up, and Azerbaijan used the energy card very
harshly against Turkey. After that point, Baku understood one thing and said:
We have to invest more in Turkey, we have to get closer to Turkey in order to
prevent another road accident. Baku would not let Turkey have a second round of
rapprochement with Yerevan, unless it is offered something interesting, like
the withdrawal of Armenian soldiers from occupied Azerbaijani territories
surrounding Karabakh.
Any government in Turkey that opens borders without
convincing Baku will be committing political suicide. Not only will it not win
votes inside, but it will be losing a neighboring country that is investing in
you and is rich in natural resources. It would basically be a stupid move.
We are approaching the end of an era. Since the end of
the Cold War, Azerbaijan has been at the center of Turkey’s policy in the
Caucasus. This is now consolidated. The direct result of this is the exclusion
of Armenia. Of course, Armenia is a problem and Turkey will try to fix it, but
currently Azerbaijan and Georgia are the two axes Turkey is building its
regional policy on and Armenia is out of his picture.
What is the likelihood of reviving the protocols?
Going back to the protocols is not an option; they are
not in the refrigerator, but rather they are dead. Both sides need to develop
new diplomatic tools, new mechanisms. And the international community should
pressure Baku, Yerevan and Moscow. Armenia is excluded from the Western camp,
and it will be much closer to Russia, especially if it joins the customs union
with Russia.
Why does the Armenian diaspora in the West not mind
Armenia coming into the Russian sphere of influence?
The diaspora does not really know Armenia. They are just
beginning to get to know Armenia. The diaspora’s main task was the recognition
of genocide and they spent lots of energy on that. After the Cold War they gave
lots of financial aid to Armenia but they did not much care about what is going
on in Armenia’s politics. Also, the diaspora does not have that much leverage
on Yerevan anyway. But now the new generation of the diaspora is going to
Armenia to work, to live. These kinds of people experienced open society, and
will object to that [the Russian sphere of influence]. So the only chance
Armenia has is the young Armenian diaspora. Otherwise, Armenia will only become
more authoritarian.
There is a lot of change in the Turks’ approach to 1915,
but this isn’t much known by the diaspora either.
1915 is no longer a taboo. The assassination of [Turkish
Armenian journalist] Hrant Dink was a crucial turning point. People started
discovering what happened in 1915, and we can openly discuss what happened to
Armenians living in Anatolia and their heritage. Of course, the old mentalities
do not change quickly, but the Justice and Development Party government is also
open to this change of rhetoric. They are open to discussing all the dimensions
of the problem. This does not mean that they will recognize or apologize, but
at least they are not disturbed that 1915 is being discussed and that there are
different opinions. Right now you can publicly state that it was genocide and
you don’t end up in jail. The Armenian diaspora needs to realize that Turkey is
not the Turkey of 10 years ago, and Turkey should explain that to the diaspora
as well. Turkey should get in touch and create dialogue mechanisms with all
segments of the Armenian diaspora.
________________________________________
Who is Aybars Görgülü?
Aybars Görgülü serves as program officer at the Foreign
Policy Program of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV).
Dr. Görgülü received his Ph.D. in Political Science from
Istanbul’s Sabancı University in 2013, and previously got his M.A. in diplomacy
and international relations from the University of Clermont-Ferrand, France and
his B.A. in Social and Political Sciences from Sabancı University.
Görgülü’s academic interest is in Turkey’s foreign policy
and the Caucasus region, and he actively participates
in civil society efforts aiming to normalize relations
between Turkey and Armenia. Görgülü has published on Turkey-Armenia relations,
Turkey’s South Caucasus policies, and Turkish foreign policy.
His publications have appeared as TESEV monographs, in
edited volumes, and in academic as well as popular journals.
December/16/2013
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