Eduard Abrahamyan
The military parade dedicated to the twenty-fifth
anniversary of Armenia’s independence has put an end to three years of
speculation about whether Armenia is in possession of the Russian-made advanced
9K720 Iskander Short-Range Ballistic Missile System (SRBMS). Starting with the
public rehearsal on September 16, 2016, with newly procured equipment, Armenia
showcased elements of the system: two transporter-erector-launchers and their
transporter-loader vehicles. Subsequently, several Russian media outlets
reported that Armenia had purchased at least one division, including a minimum
of four launchers of the Iskander system, adding that this acquisition was outside
the terms of 2015’s Armenian-Russian arms deal, which was worth $200 million.
Moreover, it was officially underscored that these systems are not the same as
the Iskander-M systems dispatched to Armenia in 2013 as reinforcement for
Russia’s 102nd Military Base in Gyumri.
The Iskander is a mobile operative-tactical missile
platform codenamed SS-26 Stone by NATO, which came to replace Soviet Scud
missile prototypes. In particular, Iskander’s missiles are designed to be
capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads, and claim to be accurate
within seven meters.
Such formidable ballistic equipment has long been the
focus of disputes between Western and Russian political actors and experts,
especially in light of the mounting standoff between NATO and Russia.
It is believed that such a missile system enables
missiles to reach their target without being detected by air-defense radar
systems or missile-intercepting assets. Iskander missiles had first been
deployed, temporarily, in the Kaliningrad region, to participate in military
drills in relative proximity to NATO states’ borders, which reasonably
triggered firm objections from the alliance. Such equipment often serves as a
political instrument in Moscow’s hands, putting pressure on NATO in pursuit of
derailing the alliance’s deterrent posture vis-à-vis Russia’s consistent
defiance. As such, in response to NATO’s intention to boost its missile-defense
capabilities by stationing the “Aegis Ashore” ballistic-missile defense shield
in Romania and Poland, the Kremlin promised to deploy its Iskander-M assets in
Crimea and Kaliningrad on a permanent basis by 2019.
This advanced equipment has now passed into the
possession of the Armenian Armed Forces. The move is likely to invigorate a new
wave of the military arms race between Yerevan and Baku, where the critical
beneficiary could well be Russia. It could be argued that by dispatching
Iskander missiles to Armenia, Moscow sought to achieve two central objectives.
Firstly, amid growing anti-Russian sentiment in Armenian society, triggered by
Moscow’s $4.5 billion military deal with Azerbaijan, Moscow has appeared to
allegedly restore the power balance between the contenders. Second, while the
procurement of Iskander SRBMs is set to reverse Moscow’s fading political
credibility in Armenia, from Moscow’s perspective, it also paves the way for
Azerbaijan and even Iran to purchase the Iskander-E missile system.
Overall, intrigue with this equipment may further
complicate the politico-military image of the region as whole. Incidentally, as
the parade was officially reviewed by the recently established joint
Armenian-Russian land force commander, Maj. Gen. Andranik Markaryan, it
conveyed the notion that the received ballistic-missile system is somehow under
Russian control. It is particularly rumored that the Iskander with several
S-300 surface-to-air air defense systems, combined with Russian 102nd Military
Base and Armenian Fourth Army Corps, will shape the core of the joint
Armenian-Russian regional army group. However, it is unlikely that the Russians
would be able to keep Yerevan from utilizing its ballistic arsenal in full if
its escalation with Azerbaijan reached the point of full-scale warfare.
It has been revealed that the supplied ballistic
equipment belongs to an export variant of Iskander—namely Iskander-E, with a
maximum engagement range of 280 kilometers instead of the classic
five-hundred-kilometer Iskander-M. It definitely might have a game-changing
effect in the case of a new phase of escalation.
Apart from this substantial ballistic reinforcement, the
Armenian Armed Forces have already had possession of comparatively modest but
operational ballistic missiles. The Armenian ballistic missile arsenal includes
the short-range Soviet Tochka-U tactical operational missile complex (SS-21
Scarab B), with an operational range of 120 kilometers. Armenia owns at least
eight launchers that, presumably, were supplied by Russia from 2010–12. Prior
to the purchase of Iskander-E SRBMs, a major part of Armenia’s ballistic
portfolio comprised the Soviet-era Elbrus tactical surface-to-surface ballistic
missiles, largely known in the West as Scud-B.
Eduard Abrahamyan
As is broadly accepted by military experts and officials,
the combat drones that Azerbaijan recently embarked on manufacturing pose a
tangible threat to Armenian military-strategic assets, including ballistic
missiles; hence the plants producing UCAVs are seen as a source of potential
menace. This is in accordance with the concept of preemptive deterrence, which
in turn enables Armenia to justify defensive preemptive strikes, similar to
those undertaken multiple times by Israel in the twentieth century. Therefore,
against the backdrop of measures applied by Baku to embolden its military
advantages with regard to its opponent, the ballistic missiles in Yerevan’s
hand may easily go from being deterrence tool to being preemptive strike
equipment, ultimately becoming an indispensable instrument for preventive
actions. A case in point: Azerbaijan’s growing military-technical potential,
seeking to challenge Armenia politically and militarily. From Armenia’s
perspective, the deterrence posture by no means implies the denial of using
ballistic missiles in the face of an imminent (preemptive) or potential
(preventive) threat. In other words, having adopted a new defense doctrine and
fostered ballistic-missile capacities, it is unlikely that Armenia should stand
aside as Azerbaijan launches the production of hundreds of combat UAVs, which
certainly will be used during a new round of escalation if the status quo holds
over Nagorno-Karabakh.
To sum up, by supplying both Armenia and Azerbaijan with
advanced equipment, Moscow has sparked an arms race between the two rivals,
which in turn will inevitably lead to new rounds of violence. This approach
apparently allows Russia to strengthen its grip on Armenia and Azerbaijan,
making them increasingly dependent in terms of arms procurement. Regardless of
Russia’s efforts to restore its credibility within Armenian society and the
political and military elite by using the arms delivery in its propaganda,
following the April fighting and Russia’s neutral stance, Armenia turned more
pragmatic in its relations with Moscow.
Eduard Abrahamyan, PhD, is a defense and regional
security analyst and scientific researcher at the University of Leicester, UK.
His expertise is on NATO’s strategy evolution and adaptation in the Eastern
Europe and Black Sea regions.
Image: 9P78-1 TEL for Iskander-M system. Wikimedia
Commons/Vitaly V. Kuzmin
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